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Abstract
Recent studies have found evidence linking Africa’s current under-
development to colonial rule and the slave trade. Given that these
events ended long ago, why do they continue to matter today? I de-
velop a model, exhibiting path dependence, that explains how these
past events could have lasting impacts. The model has multiple equi-
libria: one equilibrium with secure property rights and a high level
of production and others with insecure property rights and low levels
of production. I show that external extraction, when severe enough,
causes a society initially in the high production equilibrium to move to
a low production equilibrium. Because of the stability of low produc-
tion equilibria, the society remains trapped in this suboptimal equi-
librium even after the period of external extraction ends. The model
provides one explanation why Africa’s past events continue to matter
today.
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11 Introduction
Africa’s economic performance since independence has been poor. Between
1974 and 2002, the average individual in sub-Saharan Africa saw their real
income decline by 11% (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003, p. 2). A common
explanation for Africa’s poor economic performance is its unique history,
characterized by two events: the slave trade and colonial rule. Economic
historian Paul Bairoch argues that “there is no doubt that a large number
of structural features of the process of economic underdevelopment have
historical roots going back to European colonization” (Bairoch, 1993, p.
88). African historian Patrick Manning writes that “slavery was corruption:
it involved theft, bribery, and exercise of brute force as well as ruses. Slavery
thus may be seen as one source of precolonial origins for modern corruption”
(Manning, 1990, p. 124).
Findings from a number of recent empirical studies provide mounting
evidence that Africa’s poor economic performance in the second half of the
20th century can be partially explained by either colonialism or the slave
trade. Grier (1999) ﬁnds that the identity of the colonizer is an important
determinant of human capital levels at independence, as well as subsequent
growth. Englebert (2000a, 2000b) ﬁnds that the inadequacies of arbitrarily
imposed post-colonial institutions explains a signiﬁcant proportion of the
underdevelopment of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Acemoglu et al.
(2001, 2002) show that in former colonies, where the colonizer’s focus was
on extraction, weak institutions of private property were established and
these poor institutions persist today. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) ﬁnd
that within Africa, colonial heritage and the extent of economic penetration
during colonialism exert a direct inﬂuence on post-colonial growth rates, as
well as the accumulation of human and physical capital after independence.
Price (2003) argues that colonial heritage is able to explain the diﬀerence
in growth between countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing
countries. Lange (2004) shows that among former British colonies, colonies
that were governed by indirect rule are now less politically stable, have a
worse rule of law and have a lower quality of institutions. Nunn (2004)
ﬁnds that among African countries, the larger the number of slaves taken
from a country during the slave trade, the worse is the country’s economic
performance in the second half of the 20th century, measured using either
the rate of growth or the level of real per capita GDP.
Given the mounting evidence of a relationship between Africa’s past and
its current economic performance, a natural question arises. Why do these
events, which ended years ago, continue to matter today? In this paper, I
2develop a formal model that provides an answer to this question. It explains
why Africa’s contact with Europe during the slave trade and colonial rule
continues to aﬀect economic performance today, years after the events have
ended.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to model the impact that European contact
had on Africa. Darity (1982) develops a general equilibrium model of the
18th century system of trade between Europe, Africa and the colonies in
the Americas. The model allows for the possibility that the slave trade
had an adverse eﬀect on Africa’s production possibilities and that Africans
were under-compensated for the slaves taken from Africa. Darity then uses
the model’s predicted rates of income growth in Africa, Europe and the
colonies to test the proposition that the Atlantic slave trade was responsible
for Europe’s development and Africa’s underdevelopment. Findlay (1990)
also develops a general equilibrium model of three corner trade. Findlay
uses the model to analyze what eﬀects diﬀerent historical events, such as
the industrial revolution or the British abolition of the slave trade, had on
the price and quantities of goods produced and traded.
Darity (1982) and Findlay (1990) model the direct impacts that Euro-
pean contact had on Africa while trade was occurring (in the 18th century).
The model developed here complements their work by considering additional
persistent long-run consequences of early European contact with Africa. The
model highlights how European contact may have consequences that con-
tinue to persist long-after the end of the slave trade and colonial rule.
The model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a colonizer chooses a policy
that has two instruments: the rate of extraction and the amount of resources
to devote towards the enforcement of domestic property rights.1 The model’s
second stage focuses on an important determinant of Africa’s poor perfor-
mance: the widespread presence of robbery, theft, fraud, corruption, and
civil conﬂict (World Bank, 2005; Rowley, 2000). These are all activities that
do not result in value being created. Individuals engaged these activities
gain by taking from others. To model this, I use a distinction ﬁrst make
by Bhagwati (1982) and Baumol (1990). I assume that individuals engage
in activities that are either ‘productive’ or ‘unproductive’. Individuals en-
1The period for which the model applies includes the period of the Atlantic slave trade
prior to oﬃcial colonial rule. At this time one colonizer (even for a speciﬁc area) did not
exist. Foreign extraction was carried out by competing slave traders from diﬀerent Euro-
pean nations. When modelling the ‘colonizer’ and its strategy I am not literally modelling
one colonizer and its colonial policy, but the general impact that foreign extraction had
on Africa. Therefore, in the game when referring to the ‘colonizer’ I am referring to this
theoretical abstraction, and the term should be interpreted in this manner.
3gaged in productive activities receive a payoﬀ by producing output. Those
engaged in unproductive activities receive a payoﬀ by appropriating the out-
put of producers. Because unproductive activities simply redistribute value,
those engaged in this activity gain at the expense of the producers that are
taken from. Therefore, unproductive activities exert a negative external-
ity on those engaged in productive activities, while productive activities do
not exert a negative externality. This is the core diﬀerence between the two
types of activities. A number of other studies make this same distinction (see
Hirshleifer, 1991; Skaperdas, 1992; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Acemoglu,
1995; Francois and Baland, 2000; Grossman and Kim, 2002; Lloyd-Ellis and
Marceau, 2003). In the analysis, I use the terminology of Baumol (1990) and
call individuals engaged in productive activities ‘productive entrepreneurs’
and those engage in unproductive activities ‘unproductive entrepreneurs’.
I show that when the colonizer is absent, the second stage subgame al-
ways has an equilibrium without unproductive activities. I call this the high
production equilibrium. The intuition behind this equilibrium is as follows.
Because everyone is engaged in productive activities, the return to produc-
tion is high, causing individuals to remain engaged in productive activities.
The game may also have equilibria where many entrepreneurs are engaged
in unproductive behavior. I call these low production equilibria. The intu-
ition behind these equilibria is as follows. Because many entrepreneurs are
engaged in unproductive activities that exert a negative externality on those
that produce, the return to production is low and many individuals choose
to engage in unproductive activities rather than productive activities.
I show that when a colonizer is present and chooses a high enough level
of extraction in the ﬁrst stage, the high production equilibrium disappears
in the second stage, leaving a unique low production equilibrium. This
arises because of an asymmetry between those engaged in the two types of
activities. Individuals engaged in unproductive activities are able to avoid
extraction, while individuals engaged in productive activities are not. In the
end, the introduction of foreign extraction can move a society initially in the
high production equilibrium to a low production equilibrium. Following the
period of extraction, the high production equilibrium returns, but because of
the stability of the low production equilibrium, the society remains trapped
in this equilibrium.
This outcome describes one of two possible equilibria of the full game.
I call equilibria of this type ‘underdevelopment equilibria’. There also ex-
ist ‘development equilibria’, in which the optimal colonial policy is one of
low rates of extraction and high levels of protection of private property. In
these equilibria, a society initially in the high production equilibrium re-
4mains in this equilibrium during and after colonial rule. I contend that
underdevelopment equilibria describe the history of many African countries.
In summary, the model provides the following explanation linking Africa’s
past to its current underdevelopment:
• Prior to European contact, many African societies are located in high
production equilibria.
• During contact, external extraction lowers the return to productive
activities relative to unproductive activities. This causes the high
production equilibrium to disappear, leaving a unique low production
equilibrium.
• Individuals switch from productive activities to unproductive activi-
ties, as the society moves to the new equilibrium.
• Following the period of extraction, the society is free from the colonial
policy and a high production equilibrium again exists. However, the
society is now trapped in a low production equilibrium. The stability
of this suboptimal equilibrium makes moving to the more eﬃcient high
production equilibrium diﬃcult.
In the following section, I describe the game in detail, characterizing the
players’ optimal strategies and the game’s set of equilibria. In Section 3, I
show that the predictions of the model are consistent with Africa’s history.
In Section 4, I show how the model provides insights into the ﬁndings of
recent empirical studies. In Section 5, I describe the model’s relationship
with the existing theoretical literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The players of the game consist of a continuum of members of an African
society and one foreign colonizer.
In the ﬁrst stage, the colonizer moves, choosing a policy that consists of
two instruments. The ﬁrst is the rate of extraction τ. This is the fraction
of each productive entrepreneur’s production that is expropriated. The sec-
ond instrument is the amount of resources devoted towards enforcing the
security of private property in the society. These resources determine the
proportion q ∈ (0,1) of a productive entrepreneur’s output that an unpro-
ductive entrepreneur can steal in the second stage. The cost to the colonizer
of a policy that generates q is c(q), where c′(q) < 0 and limq→0 c′(q) = ∞.
5In the second stage, each member of the society chooses whether to
engage in productive activities or unproductive activities; these decisions
are made simultaneously. Each individual engaged in productive activities
produces the output A. Each individual engaged in unproductive activi-
ties, when successful, obtains the proportion q of the output of a producer.2
Search is costless and unproductive entrepreneurs can perfectly identify pro-
ductive entrepreneurs. Given these assumptions, the probability of an un-
productive entrepreneur’s success depends on the division of the population
between productive and unproductive entrepreneurs. Denote the fraction
of unproductive entrepreneurs by x. If there are fewer unproductive en-
trepreneurs in the society than productive entrepreneurs (x < 1 − x), then
each unproductive entrepreneur ﬁnds a productive entrepreneur to rob with
certainty; otherwise, the probability of an unproductive entrepreneur’s ﬁnd-
ing a productive entrepreneur to rob is 1−x
x . Thus, the probability of an
unproductive entrepreneur’s ﬁnding a productive entrepreneur to rob is
Pr(successful theft) =
(
1 if x ≤ .5
1−x
x if x ≥ .5
or alternatively
Pr(successful theft) = min
￿
1 − x
x
,1
￿
By a similar logic, the probability of an entrepreneur’s losing the fraction q
of her output is
Pr(stolen from) = min
￿
x
1 − x
,1
￿
Expected payoﬀs depend on the proportion of unproductive entrepreneurs
in the society, x, and on the policy chosen by the colonizer in the ﬁrst
stage, (τ,q). A producer’s expected payoﬀ is equal to the net return when
robbed, (1 − τ)(1 − q)A, multiplied by the probability of being robbed,
Pr(stolen from), plus the return when not robbed, (1 − τ)A, multiplied by
the probability of not being robbed, 1 − Pr(stolen from). That is,
πp(x,τ,q) = min
￿
x
1 − x
,1
￿
(1 − τ)(1 − q)A
+
￿
1 − min
￿
x
1 − x
,1
￿￿
(1 − τ)A (1)
2One could also assume that with probability q individuals engaged in unproductive
activities are able to steal all of the output from a producer. Because individuals are risk
neutral, the model is consistent with either interpretation.
6The expected payoﬀ of an unproductive entrepreneur is equal to the return
to successful theft, qA, multiplied by the probability of successful theft,
Pr(successful theft). When unsuccessful, an unproductive entrepreneur re-
ceives a payoﬀ of zero. Thus, the expected payoﬀ to an unproductive en-
trepreneur is
πu(x,τ,q) = min
￿
1 − x
x
,1
￿
qA (2)
Because the colonizer is unable to extract from individuals that do not
produce, τ does not directly enter an unproductive entrepreneur’s expected
payoﬀ.
The colonizer receives revenues from expropriated production and incurs
the cost c(q) to maintain q. Thus, the colonizer’s payoﬀ is
πc(x,τ,q) = τ
￿
min
￿
x
1 − x
,1
￿
(1 − q)A
+
￿
1 − min
￿
x
1 − x
,1
￿￿
A
￿
(1 − x) − c(q) (3)
A crucial assumption of the model is the speciﬁc form of colonial extrac-
tion. I make this assumption because I want τ to reﬂect an important feature
of foreign extraction in Africa; that those engaged in unproductive activities
(i.e. bandits, slave raiders, warlords, mercenaries, etc.) were better able to
avoid European extraction than those engaged in productive activities (i.e.
the peasantry).
Europeans had diﬃculty extracting from unproductive entrepreneurs be-
cause they were able to either ﬁght back, ﬂee, or even steal back from the
Europeans. In addition, Europeans often required their help to extract re-
sources from the rest of the population. During the slave trade, domestic
slave raiders, slave traders and middlemen were needed to capture slaves
and to bring them to coastal ports, where they were then shipped across
the Atlantic. This was also true during colonial rule when Africans were
required to work in the colonial army, bureaucracy, treasury or police force.
Those lucky enough to work with the colonial government were able to es-
cape the taxation, forced labor and general coercion that was inﬂicted upon
the peasant population. In short, because those engaged in unproductive
activities were specialists in violence and predation, they were either used
by Europeans to help extract resources from others, or they were able to
successfully avoid foreign extraction. I consider these issues in more detail
and provide further evidence in Section 3 of the paper.3
3Others have modelled this same interaction between productive entrepreneurs, un-
7If one ﬁnds the assumed form of European extraction too restrictive,
a more general speciﬁcation is possible. This would allow for two rates
of extraction: τp for productive entrepreneurs and τu for unproductive en-
trepreneurs. All results of the paper would hold, dependent on ∆τ ≡ τp−τu,
rather than τ. What is key for the results is the diﬀerence between the two
rates of extraction. Throughout the paper, I have chosen to sacriﬁce gener-
ality for expositional simplicity and set τu = 0 and τp = τ.
2.1 Second Stage - Pre-Contact Africa
The second stage of the game, without extraction (τ = 0) and with the
security of property, q, determined exogenously, models pre-contact Africa.
In this simpliﬁed version of the second stage subgame, payoﬀs are written as
functions of x only: πp(x) and πu(x). Despite the simplicity of the subgame,
its set of Nash equilibria have interesting properties. A strategy proﬁle in
the second stage is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame if and only if the
following condition holds:
either x = 0 and πu(x) ≤ πp(x)
or 0 < x < 1 and πu(x) = πp(x)
or x = 1 and πu(x) ≥ πp(x) (4)
The set of possible Nash equilibria is most easily seen by graphing πp(x)
and πu(x) against x for diﬀering eﬃciencies of theft, q, as in Figure 1. As
the ﬁgure shows, the slopes of the two value functions switch their relative
sizes before and after x = .5. That is,
∂πu(x)
∂x
>
∂πp(x)
∂x
if 0 ≤ x ≤ .5
∂πu(x)
∂x
<
πp(x)
∂x
if .5 ≤ x ≤ 1
This feature of the payoﬀ functions is the reason for the game’s multiple
equilibria. It is a result of the diﬀering eﬀects that an increase in x has on the
returns to both strategies. When the number of unproductive entrepreneurs
is less than the number of productive entrepreneurs (x < 1−x), an increase
in x has no eﬀect on the payoﬀs to individuals engaged in unproductive
activities, since each unproductive entrepreneur can still ﬁnd a productive
productive entrepreneurs and a government. In Grossman (2002) it is assumed that the
society’s ‘king’ is unable to tax the ‘predators’ of the economy and is only able to tax the
‘producers’.
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Figure 1: πp(x) and πu(x) graphed against x, assuming diﬀerent values of
q.
b indicates a Nash equilibrium.
entrepreneur to rob with certainty. However, an increase in x increases each
productive entrepreneur’s probability of being robbed, and thus decreases
the expected payoﬀ to those engaged in productive activities. If x > 1 − x,
then all producers are stolen from with certainty and an increase in x no
longer decreases a productive entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ. However, now
the expected payoﬀ to an unproductive entrepreneur is strictly decreasing
in x. This is because there is crowding out among individuals engaged
in unproductive activities and an increase in x decreases each unproductive
entrepreneur’s probability of ﬁnding a productive entrepreneur to steal from.
Figure 1 also shows that there always exists an equilibrium in which
x = 0. For low values of q this equilibrium is unique. However, as q in-
9creases eventually other equilibria arise. In these equilibria, both productive
activities and unproductive activities are chosen. A description of the set of
Nash equilibria is provided in Proposition 1. The proof of this proposition,
along with all other proofs, is reported in the appendix.
Proposition 1. For all values of q and A, the second-stage subgame has
a Nash equilibrium in which every person chooses to produce, x⋆ = 0. If
q < .5, this equilibrium is unique. If q = .5, the subgame has one additional
equilibrium with x⋆ = .5. If .5 < q < 1, the subgame has two additional
equilibria; one with x⋆ = 1 − q < .5 and the other with x⋆ = q > .5.
As summarized by Proposition 1, absent external contact, a high pro-
duction equilibrium always exists and if q low enough, then this equilibrium
is unique. In the next section, I show how this result changes once foreign
extraction by a colonizer is introduced.
2.2 Second Stage - Post-Contact Africa
To analyze the changes that occur following European expansion, I consider
the model in a dynamic environment. To model dynamics, I have chosen to
use the two-player version of the standard replicator dynamic4
xt+1 − xt
xt
= γ [πu(xt,τ,q) − π(xt,τ,q)] (5)
if xt > 0, where π is the average payoﬀ of the full population,
π(xt,τ,q) = xtπu(xt,τ,q) + (1 − xt)πp(xt,τ,q) (6)
Although the original interpretation of the dynamic is biological, the dy-
namic is also consistent with models of local information or social evolution
(Gintis, 2000; Weibull, 1995). I assume that the population is imperfectly
informed about the value of xt. In every period each player, with proba-
bility γ > 0, compares her payoﬀ in the previous period to that of another
randomly selected player. If the other player’s payoﬀ is higher, then she
switches. If not, the player maintains her original strategy. Given these
assumptions the replicator dynamic (5) can be derived (Gintis, 1997, p. 28).
4None of the results of the paper depend on the speciﬁc dynamic that I have chosen
to use. One could use any dynamic that establishes the stability of the game’s equilibria.
For example, one could assume an overlapping generations setting, where each period the
proportion γ of the population die and are replaced with new players. These new players
are perfectly informed, but must make a once-and-for-all choice to engage in productive
or unproductive activities. See Acemoglu (1995) for a dynamic of this type.
10I make the additional assumption that a very small proportion of the
population ε > 0 is fully informed about the game5 and therefore these
individuals choose in each period the strategy that yields the highest payoﬀ.6
Therefore, when xt = 0, if πu(0,τ,q) − πp(0,τ,q) ≤ 0, then xt+1 = 0, but if
πu(0,τ,q) − πp(0,τ,q) > 0, then
xt+1 = ε (7)
Combining (5), (6) and (7), we have
xt+1 − xt =
(
ε if xt = 0 and πu(0,τ,q) > πp(0,τ,q)
F(xt) otherwise
(8)
where
F(xt) ≡ xt(1 − xt)γ [πu(xt,τ,q) − πp(xt,τ,q)] (9)
A Nash equilibrium, x⋆, is stable if and only if
F′(x⋆) < 0 (10)
Condition (10) ensures that a small perturbation of x above x⋆ results in
a subsequent decrease in x back to x⋆, and that a small perturbation of x
below x⋆ results in an increase in x back to x⋆. It is useful to deﬁne the
basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium x⋆. The basin of attraction of x⋆
is the set of points x0 such that a trajectory through x0 converges over time
to x⋆. That is, it is the set of initial population proportions that converge
to x⋆.
The dynamics of the subgame are illustrated in Figure 2, the dynamic
analogue of Figure 1. Looking at Figure 2, we see that the high production
equilibrium is stable and that one of the two equilibria that exist when
q > .5 is stable and the other is unstable. The following proposition more
completely states the dynamic properties of the subgame’s equilibria.
5It is assumed that ε is suﬃciently small that the actions of this fraction of the popu-
lation can be ignored in expression (5).
6Without this modiﬁcation, members from a population with only productive en-
trepreneurs (x = 0) would never switch to unproductive activities. This is true even
when πu(0,τ,q) > πp(0,τ,q). Intuitively, because only productive entrepreneurs exist
in the population, an unproductive entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is never sampled and therefore
members of the population never switch to unproductive activities. This is a general fea-
ture and short-coming of the standard replicator dynamic. See Gintis (2000), pp. 191–192
for a discussion of this issue.
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Figure 2: πp(x) and πu(x) graphed against x, assuming diﬀerent values of
q.
b indicates a stable equilibrium, and indicates an unstable equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 3. If τ is high enough then a unique
stable Nash equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. For all values of q and A, the second-stage subgame has
a stable Nash equilibrium with x⋆ = 0. If q = .5, the subgame has one
additional unstable equilibrium with x⋆ = .5. If .5 < q < 1, the subgame
has one additional stable equilibrium with x⋆ = q > .5 and one unstable
equilibrium with x⋆ = 1 − q < .5. The unstable equilibrium deﬁnes the
border of the basins of attraction of the two stable equilibria.
I now consider the impact that European extraction has on the African
society. From Proposition 2, we know that without extraction (τ = 0) there
always exists a high production equilibrium. However, as Proposition 3
states, if extraction is severe enough, then the high production equilibrium
disappears, leaving a unique, stable low production equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If τ > 1 − q, then the game has a unique, stable Nash
equilibrium with x⋆ =
q
q+(1−τ)(1−q) > .5.
The rationale behind Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 3. As shown,
increases in τ have an asymmetric eﬀect on the payoﬀ to each activity.
Increases in τ decrease the payoﬀ to productive activities, while leaving the
payoﬀ to unproductive activities unchanged. Therefore, as τ is increased,
eventually at x = 0 the payoﬀ to unproductive activities becomes larger than
the payoﬀ to productive activities, and this leaves a unique low production
equilibrium.
132.3 An Explanation of Africa’s Underdevelopment
Given the properties of the model developed to this point, an account of
the historical origins of Africa’s underdevelopment can be given. This is
done graphically in Figure 4. The top graph of the ﬁgure illustrates an
African society initially located in the high production equilibrium x⋆
0 prior
to European contact. After contact, because of the introduction of new
technologies, A may increase. But, the increase in A shifts the payoﬀs to
both types of activities proportionately and therefore does not aﬀect the
equilibria. In reality, q may also have increased because of the introduction
of ﬁrearms and other weapons to the continent, but I assume here that q
remains constant. Allowing q to change does not aﬀect any of my arguments.
Next, consider what occurs if the colonizer chooses a level of extraction
so high that τ > 1 − q. This is illustrated in the middle graph of Figure
4. European extraction distorts the relative returns to the two types of
activities enough to cause the high production equilibrium x⋆
0 to disappear.
This leaves a unique stable low production equilibrium x⋆
2. Each period,
individuals who were previously engaged in productive activities switch to
unproductive activities, causing x to increase over time. This continues
until x⋆
2 is reached. In reality, individuals, families and tribes that had
been cultivators or hunter-gatherers began buying guns and engaging in
slave raiding, theft and other forms of predatory behavior. I discuss these
historic changes in more detail in Section 3.
The situation following independence is illustrated in the bottom graph
of Figure 4. After independence, τ returns to zero. If the period of European
extraction was long enough, then x will have increased suﬃciently such that
by independence x will be within the basin of attraction of the new low
production equilibrium x⋆
3. More precisely, if at independence x > xB, then
after independence x will converge to x⋆
3.
In the end, European extraction has permanently moved a society ini-
tially in the high production equilibrium x⋆
0 to a low production equilibrium
x⋆
3, characterized by insecure property rights and low levels of production.
2.4 First Stage - The Colonizer’s Strategy
The model’s explanation for the historical origins of Africa’s underdevelop-
ment relies on the assumption that it is optimal, at least under some con-
ditions, for the colonizer to choose values of τ and q that satisfy τ > 1 − q
(see Proposition 3). I now consider the ﬁrst stage of the game to show that
there are two possible optimal strategies for the colonizer and that under
14A
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Pre-contact: τ = 0
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πu(x,τ,q)
πp(x,τ,q)
(1 − τ)A
qA
x⋆
2
Post-contact with high extraction: τ = .4
b
πp(x,τ,q)
πu(x,τ,q)
A
qA
x⋆
0 xB x⋆
3
Post-independence: τ = 0
b b
πu(x,τ,q)
πp(x,τ,q)
Figure 4: An explanation for the historical origins of Africa’s persistent
underdevelopment. In each ﬁgure q = .7.
15one of the two strategies τ > 1 − q.
In choosing the rate of extraction τ and the protection of private prop-
erty, which determines q, the colonizer is choosing what institutions to im-
plement in the colony. Because in reality it is diﬃcult to adjust these in-
stitutions each period, I assume that the colonizer’s choice of (τ,q) is made
once-and-for-all.
I also assume that after each period of play, with positive probability, the
colonizer loses control of the colony. Let the probability that the colonizer
maintains control and continues the game next period be given by δ ∈ (0,1).
The colonizer’s payoﬀ over the inﬁnite horizon is then
Πc(τ,q) = (1 − δ)
∞ X
t=0
δtπc(xt,τ,q) (11)
As will be shown, δ is key in determining the colonizer’s optimal strategy.
During this time, a primary determinant of δ would have been the number of
settlers from the colonizer’s country. If a country was able to settle an area,
they could be relatively more conﬁdent that they had long-term control over
the area. I consider this aspect of the model in more detail in Section 4.3,
where I discuss the relationship between the model and the empirical work
of Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Consider a society that is initially located in the high production equi-
librium with x0 = 0. Given this initial population distribution, I argue that
the colonizer’s optimal choice of (τ,q) must satisfy τ ≥ 1 − q. This can
be seen as follows. If τ < 1 − q, then xt = 0 for all t, and from (3), the
colonizer’s payoﬀ is
Πc(τ,q) = πc(0,τ,q) = τA − c(q) (12)
which is strictly increasing in τ. Any strategy (τ,q), with τ < 1 − q, is
strictly dominated by the strategy (τ′,q) with τ′ = 1 − q. Therefore, any
strategy with τ < 1 − q is not optimal.
Among the strategies that satisfy τ ≥ 1 − q, I consider two types:
1. Strategies with τ > 1 − q, which I call short-run strategies (SR). As
shown in Proposition 3, these strategies cause xt to converge to x⋆ =
q
q+(1−τ)(1−q) > .5.
2. Strategies with τ = 1−q, which I call long-run strategies (LR). These
maintain the initial equilibrium with x⋆ = 0.
16I argue that both LR and SR strategies can be optimal, and that which is
optimal depends on δ. The ﬁrst step of this argument is the following result.
Lemma 1. For every LR strategy, there are SR strategies that yield a higher
payoﬀ in at least the ﬁrst period.
To prove this, consider the colonizer’s payoﬀ in the ﬁrst period,
πc(0,τ,q) = τA − c(q) (13)
which is increasing in both τ and q. Given any LR strategy (τ,q), SR
strategies can always be found that yield a higher payoﬀ. Under each LR
strategy, τ = 1 − q. Therefore, SR strategies (τ′,q), with τ′ > τ, and SR
strategies (τ,q′), with q′ > q (recall c′(q) < 0), all yield a higher payoﬀ in
the ﬁrst period.
The second part of the argument is given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. There exists ¯ t suﬃciently large, such that the best LR strategy
yields higher payoﬀs in each period t ≥ ¯ t than do all SR strategies.
To prove this, ﬁx any SR strategy (ˆ τ, ˆ q). Under this strategy, over time
xt increases from x0 = 0 to x⋆ =
ˆ q
ˆ q+(1−ˆ τ)(1−ˆ q) > .5. Consider a period t
large enough that under (ˆ τ, ˆ q), xt ≥ .5. From (3), the colonizer’s payoﬀ in
this period is
πc(xt, ˆ τ, ˆ q) = ˆ τ(1 − ˆ q)A(1 − xt) − c(ˆ q) (14)
Next, consider the best LR strategy. Under any LR strategy xt = 0, τ =
1 − q, and the colonizer’s payoﬀ each period is given by
πc(0,τ,q) = (1 − q)A − c(q) (15)
Denote the value of (τ,q) that maximizes (15) by (τ⋆,q⋆). This is the best
LR strategy. Then, using (14) and (15), we have the following result
πc(0,τ⋆,q⋆) = (1 − q⋆)A − c(q⋆)
≥ (1 − ˆ q)A − c(ˆ q)
> ˆ τ(1 − ˆ q)A(1 − xt) − c(ˆ q)
= πc(xt, ˆ τ, ˆ q)
That is, for t large enough that xt ≥ .5 under the SR strategy, the best LR
strategy yields higher payoﬀs than any SR strategy.
Lemmas 1 and 2 illustrate that the choice between the two types of
strategies involves a trade-oﬀ between larger payoﬀs in early periods and
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Figure 5: The streams of payoﬀs under an LR strategy and an SR strategy.
larger payoﬀs in later periods. This is shown clearly in Figure 5, which
illustrates the payoﬀs over time to both types of strategies. The ﬁgure
illustrates the results of Lemmas 1 and 2: in at least the initial period the
SR strategy yields a higher payoﬀ, but in later periods the LR strategy yields
higher payoﬀs. The ﬁgure also shows that payoﬀs under an SR strategy are
monotonically decreasing over time. This follows from the fact πc(xt,τ,q) is
decreasing in xt. Therefore, over time, as xt monotonically increases under
any SR strategy, πc(xt,τ,q) monotonically decreases. The ﬁgure also shows
that under any LR strategy xt = 0 for all t and thus πc(0,τ,q) remains
constant.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, and Figure 5, it follows that which of the two
types of strategies is optimal depends on the government’s preference over
the inﬁnite horizon, which is determined by δ. More precisely, we have the
following result.
Proposition 4. For any γ and A, there exists ¯ δ ∈ (0,1) such that the
colonizer’s optimal strategy is an LR strategy if δ > ¯ δ and an SR strategy if
δ < ¯ δ.
If the colonizer has a secure hold on the colony (δ is high), then an LR
strategy will be optimal. However, if the colonizer has a suﬃciently tenuous
grip on the colony (δ is low), then an SR strategy will be optimal.
2.5 Equilibria
Combining both stages, the game’s two types of equilibria can be described.
181. Development Equilibria. The colonizer chooses an LR strategy,
with τ = 1 − q. In the second stage, every period each individual
chooses to engage in productive activities and the economy remains
in the high production equilibrium, with x⋆ = 0. After the colonizer
exits the country and τ returns to zero, the society remains in the high
production equilibrium.
2. Underdevelopment Equilibria. The colonizer chooses an SR strat-
egy, with τ > 1 − q. Over time, individuals switch from productive
activities to unproductive activities as the society converges to a low
production equilibrium. If enough time has passed, then the society
will be located within the basin of attraction of a post-colonial low pro-
duction equilibrium. After independence the society remains trapped
in this stable low production equilibrium.
3 Historical Evidence
I have argued that the model’s underdevelopment equilibria provide one
explanation for the historical origins of Africa’s persistent underdevelop-
ment. If this is true, then looking at Africa’s past the following parts of
the model’s explanation should be observed: (1) prior to European con-
tact, many African societies were located in high production equilibria (2)
external extraction, during the slave trade and colonial rule, lowered the
return to productive activities relative to unproductive activities (3) after
European contact, the proportion of individuals engaged in unproductive
activities increased over time. In what follows, I show that Africa’s history
provides support for each part of the model’s explanation.
Part 1. Prior to European contact, many African societies were located in
high production equilibria.
Although it is not possible to directly observe the proportion of pre-
contact African societies that were in high production equilibria prior to
European contact, the available evidence suggests that African societies had
levels of economic and social development that were similar to other soci-
eties around the world. Amin (1972) writes that “Black Africa was not on
the whole more backward than the rest of the world. The continent was
characterized by complex social formations, sometimes accompanied by the
development of the state, and almost invariably based on visible social vari-
ations which revealed the disintegration of the primitive village community”
(p. 506). African societies had developed customs, laws, conventions, ethics
19or rituals to resolve conﬂict and enforce order. Many societies maintained
order through kinship ties or a lineage system, where disputes were either
resolved by consensus or through a council of elders. The more centralized
societies had developed formal political systems and advanced legal insti-
tutions that resemble modern day courts (Bohannan and Curtin, 1998, pp.
147–167; Adejumobi, 2000).
One of the only ﬁrst-hand written account of pre-contact Africa comes
from the Moroccan traveller Ibn Batt´ uta, who travelled to the empire of
Mali in 1352. He describes the road from Wal¯ ata, located in modern Mauri-
tania, to the capital of Mali as being safe and the empire as well functioning
with peaceful inhabitants (Ibn Batt´ uta, 1929, p. 322). “The negroes pos-
sess some admirable qualities. They are seldom unjust, and have a greater
abhorrence of injustice than any other people...There is complete security
in their country. Neither traveller nor inhabitant in it has anything to fear
from robbers or men of violence.” (Ibn Batt´ uta, 1929, p. 329).
Although, systematic quantitative evidence of the degree to which in-
dividuals engaged in unproductive activities is unavailable, information is
known about certain speciﬁc activities. Recent studies have shown that one
unproductive activity, chattel slavery, was not commonly practiced before
European contact in those parts of Africa that were untouched by the trans-
Saharan slave trade (Inikori, 2000; Rodney, 1966). The most extensively
studied part of Africa is west central Africa. Studies by linguists show that
the people of this area did not have words for ‘slave’ or ‘slavery’ before the
rise of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Other words, which originally meant
‘servant’, ‘prisoner’ or ‘captive’, took on new meaning and were applied to
describe slaves and slavery (Hilton, 1985; Vansina, 1989, 1990). The writ-
ings of African explorer David Livingstone provide added support for this
ﬁnding. Livingstone documents that prior to contact with the Portuguese,
the Makololo of west central Africa were completely alien to the concept of
people being bought and sold (Beachey, 1979, p. 206).
As Bairoch (1988) argues and as Acemoglu et al. (2002) document, an
area’s urban population is a good indicator of its prosperity, progress and
overall level of economic development. The available data on city size and ur-
banization rates provide additional evidence that the regions of sub-Saharan
Africa were as prosperous and developed as other regions of the world. Many
of the cities in Central Sudan had large populations. By the end of the 15th
century, Gao’s population reached 60,000, Gobir’s population was 28,000,
Kano’s was 50,000, Timbuktu’s was 25,000, and Jenne’s was 20,000. The
cities of modern Nigeria were also large. Katunga, the capital of Oyo, had a
population of 50,000 during the 15th century (Chandler, 1987, pp. 282–296).
20The city of Benin had a population between 60,000 and 70,000 and was a
“well-ordered urban center with a system of water conduits and a sizable
artisanry working at an advanced level” (Bairoch, 1988, p. 58). Further
south, Mbanza Kongo, the capital of the Kongo Kingdom, had a population
of 40,000 during 15th century (Chandler, 1987, p. 300). Eastern Africa had
also enjoyed nearly 300 years of “remarkable prosperity” prior to the arrival
of the Portuguese at the end of the 15th century (Oliver and Fage, 1962, p.
98). Before the Portuguese conquest of Kilwa, its population had reached
30,000. The population of the ancient city of Zimbabwe had reached 40,000
by the end of the 15th century (Chandler, 1987, pp. 286, 301).
Combining data from McEvedy and Jones (1978) and Chandler (1987), I
have constructed urbanization estimates for sub-Saharan countries in 1500.
I follow the exact methodology used in Acemoglu et al. (2002). Zimbabwe’s
urbanization rate is 15%, Mali’s is 12.7%, Mauritania’s is 6.7%, Nigeria’s is
4.8%, Angola’s is 3.1%, Niger’s is 2.3%, Ethiopia’s is 2.7% and Tanzania’s is
1.7%. Outside of Europe, these urbanization rates are among the highest in
the world. As a comparison, for this same period of time, the urbanization
rates of Peru and Mexico, the locations of the Inca and Aztec empires, are
2.5% and 6.5%. The urbanization rate of India is 1.8% and Portugal is 5.8%
(Acemoglu et al., 2002).
Part 2. External extraction, during the slave trade and colonial rule, lowered
the return to productive activities relative to unproductive activities.
From the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the 19th century,
European contact with Africa primarily took the form of the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. During this time approximately 12 million slaves were shipped
to the Americas (Lovejoy, 2000). The external demand for slaves provided
increased opportunities for individuals to engage in activities that did not
produce output. Slave raiders, slave traders and other middlemen were
needed to capture slaves and to bring them to coastal ports, where they
were shipped across the Atlantic by the Europeans. Slave raiding and slave
trading are unproductive activities because they do not create value. The
source of the surplus gained by those engaged in these activities ultimately
comes from the labor stolen from the slave. Although he does not use the
model’s terminology, Darity (1992) describes the change in relative payoﬀs
of the two types of activities when he writes that “the most lucrative activity
throughout the 18th century for those Africans with the power to enslave
rather than be enslaved was procurement of human exports for the slave
trade.” (p. 165).
21Beginning in the early 19th century, the trans-Atlantic slave trade was
slowly brought to an end. As the slave trade declined, European coloniza-
tion of the continent was beginning, with the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885
marking the beginning of oﬃcial colonial rule. Although the period of colo-
nial rule was very diﬀerent from the slave trade, it continued to alter the
return to productive activities relative to unproductive activities.
Colonial policies of land expropriation, taxation, and forced labor tar-
geted those that produced: the peasantry. Land expropriation was common
in colonial Africa. In South Africa, by 1925 over 90% of the land had been
expropriated by European settlers (Buell, 1928a, p. 513). Poll, head and hut
taxes were the main tools used to raise revenues for the colonies. Taxes also
served as an indirect tool of extraction by forcing the African peasantry into
extractive employment relations. Annual taxes, usually equivalent to about
30 days of work, could only be paid in the oﬃcial colonial currency, not
in-kind (Buell, 1928a, 1928b; Nzula et al., 1979). As a result, natives were
forced to sign restrictive labor contracts, lasting up to two years, in order to
obtain the necessary currency to pay the taxes. Once signed, these contracts
could not be broken by the native without severe punishment (Buell, 1928a,
pp. 498–500, 629). Forced labor was also common. Peasants were required
to engage in employment that was either provided without compensation or
for wages well below the market rates. In the Belgian Congo, natives were
required to spend 40 hours each month gathering rubber for the colony,
while in Uganda natives were obliged to provide 30 days of free labor a year
on the roads (Buell, 1928b, pp. 429–431; Buell, 1928a, p. 567). In Kenya, in
addition to an unpaid obligation to work 24 days a year, natives were also
required to provide up to 60 days a year of compulsory, compensated labor
(Berman and Lonsdale, 1980, p. 68).
Those that were engaged in unproductive activities were better able
avoid European extraction. Some chose to either work for the Europeans,
ﬁght against the Europeans, or join roaming bandit groups. Those that
worked with the Europeans in the colonial administration, either as part
of the colonial army, bureaucracy, treasury or police force, were exempt
from the taxation, forced labor and general coercion that was inﬂicted upon
the rest of the population. These individuals survived not by producing,
but by obtaining a portion of the resources that were extracted from the
peasantry. Those who were able to escape colonial extraction by joining
rebel armies or bandit groups also did not produce. Bandits lived by raiding
local communities and caravan routes. Rebel armies lived oﬀ the transfer
of food and goods from rural peasants. At times the transfers were made
voluntarily, but most often rebels plundered local peasant populations or
22extorted payment through threats of violence and other forms of coercion
(Kriger, 1988; McCann, 1985).
Overall, during the slave trade and colonial rule, those engaged in unpro-
ductive activities were either used by Europeans to help extract resources
from the peasantry or they were better able to successfully avoid foreign
extraction.
Part 3. After European contact, the proportion of individuals engaged in
unproductive activities increased over time.
The increases in unproductive activities such as banditry, kidnapping,
and warfare during the period of the slave trade have been well documented
by African historians. Patrick Manning (1990) writes that “by the nine-
teenth century, much of the continent was militarized; great kingdoms and
powerful warlords rose and fell, their fates linked to ﬂuctuations in the slave
trade...Even in egalitarian communities, the temptation to proﬁt from the
sale of captives or culprits kept the slave trade alive.” (p. 147). Law (1991)
writes that “the eﬀects were seen not only in the increasing level of disorder,
but also in the increasing prominence of groups for whom violence was a
profession. The emergence of banditry and mercenary soldiering was paral-
leled by the militarization of existing ruling ´ elites.” (p. 346). Among those
that did not engage directly in the slave trade, some formed bandit groups
that raided local agricultural communities for slaves and goods. Others be-
came highway robbers and stole from caravans along trade routes (Miller,
1988, pp. 134, 147). In Borguland, West Africa, armed banditry and the
raiding of caravans had intensiﬁed to such an extent during the 18th and
19th centuries, that by the 20th century all forms of commercial activities
had all but disappeared completely (Akinwumi, 2001).
Trade data from the port of Quelimane, Mozambique, provide added ev-
idence of the extent of the switch from productive to unproductive activities
during the slave trade. Between 1806 and 1821, slave exports increased by
240%. At the same time, rice exports fell by 88% and wheat exports fell by
95% (Austen, 1987, pp. 68–71). In 1705, the Dutch Director-General wrote
about similar drops in production that were occurring on the Gold Coast:
“it has completely changed into a Slave Coast, and the natives nowadays no
longer occupy themselves with the search for gold, but rather make war on
each other to furnish slaves.” (Richards, 1980, p. 46).
During colonial rule, unproductive activities continued. Many of the
Africans that had been involved in the slave trade made the switch to work-
ing for the colonial government. For example, the former Yao slave raiding
23chiefs Matipwiri, Chikumbo and Tambala of the Nyasa area, all became as-
sistants for the colonial government (Beachey, 1976, p. 219). For others, the
only way to escape the oppression of colonial rule was to ﬂee and join bandit
groups. These groups raided local African communities, looting goods, and
stealing African women and children to sell into domestic slavery. Although
data on the number of individuals who lived through theft and banditry are
unavailable, historic accounts suggest that the practices were widespread.
Studies have documented the pervasiveness of various forms of raiding, theft
and banditry in Tanzania (Shorter, 1968); South Africa and Namibia (Lau,
1986); Angola (Clarence-Smith and Moorson, 1975; Clarence-Smith, 1985);
Nigeria and Benin (Falola, 1996); Ethiopia (Caulk, 1978; McCann, 1985;
Simpson, 1996); Sudan (Sikainga, 1989); Mauritania (Taylor, 1995); and
Mali (Hall, 2003).
Others were able to work with the colonial authorities in the colonial
army, police force or native treasury as tax collectors. These individuals did
not produce, but lived by receiving a portion of the value that was taken from
the peasantry. In addition, colonial employment conferred power to these
individuals that could be used to extract even greater resources from the
general population (Buell, 1928b, pp. 431–432; Falola, 1996, pp. 86–95). The
colonial armies formed at this time continued to persist after independence.
The adverse eﬀects of this persistent have been studied by Boahen (1985)
who writes that the “armies have become the heaviest millstones round the
necks of African governments and peoples” (p. 789).
A ﬁnal unproductive activity that arose during this period was rebellion
against the colonialists. As Collier (2000) point outs, “rebellion is large-scale
predation of productive economic activities” (p. 3). Guerilla ﬁghters did
not produce, but lived through transfers from peasant populations obtained
primarily through coercion, threats of violence or direct force (Kriger, 1988;
McCann, 1985).
4 Additional Predications of the Model and Re-
lated Empirical Evidence
4.1 Explaining Africa’s Economic Deterioration since Inde-
pendence
As documented by Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), sub-Saharan Africa has
been in economic decline over the past 30 years. Among the 40 countries of
sub-Saharan Africa for which income data back to independence are avail-
24able, 18 or 45% were poorer in 2000 than they were at independence.7 A
similar deterioration is also found in a recent survey on corruption reported
in Hoddess (2001). Individuals from seven former British colonies were asked
whether they felt that corruption is lower under the current government rel-
ative to the previous government. In only two of the seven countries did the
majority of the respondents feel that there was less corruption under the
current regime than the previous one (p. 309).
The model provides an explanation for this deterioration since indepen-
dence. Consider the model’s explanation for Africa’s underdevelopment,
shown in Figure 4. As argued, if the colonizer chooses an SR strategy, then
x will increase over time. If at independence x is between xB and x⋆
3, then
after independence x will continue to increase and total production in the
economy, given by (1−x)A, will continue to decrease. Therefore, the model
is able to explain the fall in output and increase in corruption that has
occurred since independence in many African countries.
4.2 Length of Colonial Rule and Severity of Extraction
The model provides an explanation for the seemingly contradictory ﬁndings
of Bertocchi and Canova (2002), Nunn (2004) and Grier (1999). Bertoc-
chi and Canova (2002) and Nunn (2004) show that European extraction,
measured using either repatriated proﬁts from the colony or the number of
slaves exported during the slave trade, is negatively correlated with subse-
quent economic performance. This ﬁnding suggests that for African coun-
tries European contact was detrimental for growth. However, Grier (1999)
ﬁnds that the longer a country was colonized the better it tended to per-
form after independence. This suggests that greater European contact was
beneﬁcial for growth. The model is able to provide a consistent explanation
for the two seemingly contradictory results.
The measures of penetration used by Bertocchi and Canova (2002) and
Nunn (2004) are captured by τ in the model. From the model we know that
colonies with a lower τ are more likely to remain in the high production
equilibrium after independence. Therefore, countries with lower rates of
extraction during colonialism should perform better after independence. To
see how the model is able to explain Grier’s (1999) ﬁnding that colonies with
longer periods of rule perform better, consider Figure 6 which reproduces
7These ﬁgures are based on the author’s calculations using real per capita GDP data
from the Penn World Tables Mark 6.1. The variable used is ‘rgdpch’. For some countries
data are unavailable for 2000. For these countries I use the most recent year for which
data are available.
25t
0
Colonizer’s
Payoﬀ
t tsr tlr
SR strategy
payoﬀ
LR strategy
payoﬀ
Additional
cost
Figure 6: The decolonization process of a colonizer pursuing an LR strategy
and a colonizer pursuing an SR strategy.
the stream of per period payoﬀs overtime under both colonial strategies from
Figure 5. The two payoﬀs can be interpreted as representing two diﬀerent
colonies, with colonizers pursuing diﬀerent strategies. Assume that there
also exists an additional, initially unanticipated cost to colonialism that is
increasing over time. This may be a political cost due to changing public
opinion in the home country. The cost is given by the dotted line in the
ﬁgure. If the cost increases suﬃciently, then eventually the net beneﬁt of
the colony becomes negative. It it is no longer proﬁtable to keep the colony
and independence is granted. If independence occurs after period t, then
the colonizer pursuing the SR strategy will grant the colony independence
sooner than the colonizer pursuing the LR strategy. This is shown in the
ﬁgure where colonial rule lasts longer under the LR strategy: tsr < tlr.
Intuitively, this is because in the long-run, colonies under LR strategies are
more proﬁtable than colonies under SR strategies, and therefore LR strategy
colonies are kept longer than SR strategy colonies.
In the end, the two seemingly contradictory ﬁndings can be explained by
the model. Colonies under an LR strategy are extracted from less and remain
in the high production equilibrium, performing better after independence.
Because in the long-run these colonies are more proﬁtable, they are granted
independence later than the less proﬁtable SR strategy colonies.
264.3 Institutions, Settler Mortality and Equilibrium Selection
The model developed here complements the recent empirical work of Ace-
moglu et al. (2001). The study ﬁnds that among former colonies, diﬀerent
colonization strategies implemented by Europeans led to very diﬀerent paths
of development. Colonies where the European focus was on extraction did
not develop and stagnated economically. In other colonies the focus was
not on extraction and the colonizer implemented institutions to enforce the
rule of law and protect private property. Today these colonies are among
the richest countries in the world. The authors ﬁnd that the disease en-
vironment was a primary determinant of which of the two strategies were
followed. In areas with a high disease environment settlement was diﬃcult
and extractive institutions were implemented, while in areas with a low dis-
ease environment settle was possible and institutions of private property
were implemented.
By providing a theoretical framework for their analysis, the model helps
clarify two points from Acemoglu et al. (2001). First, it is not clear why
initially implemented institutions should persist and why they should con-
tinue to matter decades after the end of colonialism. The model provides
one explanation. In colonies with a high disease environment, the focus
was on extraction and domestic institutions to enforce the rule of law and
protect private property were not implemented. Within the framework of
the model, in these colonies the colonizer pursued an SR strategy, with
τ > 1 − q. This led to a permanent movement to a low production equi-
librium. These colonies remain trapped in this equilibrium today. On the
other hand, colonies with a low disease environment could be settled and in-
stitutions to protect private property were implemented. In these areas the
colonizer pursued an LR strategy with τ = 1 − q and the colony remained
in the high production equilibrium.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) assume that in areas with low disease environ-
ments, settlement occurred and colonizers did not focus on extraction, but
instead chose to implement good institutions. The model provides support
for this assumption by showing that it is an equilibrium outcome of the
game. This can be seen as follows. At this time, because of competition
between European nations, control over foreign territory was tenuous. The
best way to secure control of a region was through settlement. If a country
was able to settle an area, they could be more conﬁdent that they would
have long-term control of the land. In the model this long-term control is
given by δ, the probability of the game continuing for the colonizer. Low
rates of settler mortality increased settlement, which decreased the proba-
27bility of the colonizer losing control of an area, raising δ. From Proposition
4 we know that the higher is δ, the more likely it is that an LR strategy
is chosen. Overall, in areas where settlement was feasible, δ was high, and
the colonizer was more likely to choose an LR strategy with a lower rate of
extraction and more secure property rights.
5 Related Theoretical Literature
Other studies have formally modelled other aspects of colonialism. Gross-
man and Iyigun (1995, 1997) and Lucas (1990) model the proﬁtability and
choice of foreign investment by the colonizing country and Garoupa and
Gata (2002) model the European decolonization process.
The model’s second stage subgame is related to the theoretical literature
on conﬂict and appropriation, beginning with Hirshleifer (1991) and Skaper-
das (1992), and more recently Grossman and Kim (2002) and Mehlum et al.
(2003). The model’s second stage is also related to papers that model the ex-
istence of multiple equilibria in corruption or other unproductive activities.
These studies include Murphy et al. (1993), Acemoglu (1995), Advig and
Moene (1990), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), and Tirole (1996). The model devel-
oped in Acemoglu (1995) is the most similar to the model’s second stage.
He assumes that labor can be allocated to productive activities called ‘en-
trepreneurship’ or unproductive activities called ‘rent-seeking’. In every pe-
riod, each individual chooses which activity to undertake. Unlike my model,
his model assumes that producers also choose their level of investment and
that each period agents are randomly matched. He shows that, depending
on the parameters of the model and the cost function for investment, there
is the possibility of multiple equilibria: one equilibrium with no rent-seeking
and another with a positive level of rent-seeking.
6 Conclusions
Findings from a number of recent empirical studies provide mounting evi-
dence that Africa’s poor performance in the second half of the 20th century
can be partially explained by its unique history, which is characterized by
two key events: the slave trade and colonial rule. Given this evidence, a nat-
ural question arises. Why do these events, which ended years ago, continue
to matter today? I have developed a model, exhibiting path dependence,
that provides one answer to this question. The model features multiple
equilibria. There is one equilibrium with secure property rights and a high
28level of production and other equilibria with insecure property rights and
low levels of production. I have shown that external extraction, when severe
enough, causes a society initially in the high production equilibrium to move
to a low production equilibrium. Because of the stability of low production
equilibria, the society remains trapped in this suboptimal equilibrium even
after the period of external extraction ends. This is how Africa’s past con-
tinues to aﬀect economic performance today.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider each statement of the proposition in
turn.
For all values of q and A, the second-stage subgame has a Nash equilibrium
in which every person chooses to produce, x⋆ = 0.
From (4), if πp(0) ≥ πu(0), then a Nash equilibrium with x = 0 exists.
Using (1) and (2), this condition simpliﬁes to 1 ≥ q, which is satisﬁed for
all values of A and q.
If q < .5, this equilibrium is unique.
If q < .5, then πp(x) > πu(x) for all values of x, and no additional
equilibria exist.
If q = .5, the subgame has one additional equilibrium with x⋆ = .5.
If q = .5, then πp(.5) = πu(.5). Condition (4) is satisﬁed and one addi-
tional Nash equilibrium exists, with x⋆ = .5 when q = .5.
If .5 < q < 1, the game has two additional equilibria; one with x⋆ = 1−q < .5
and the other with x⋆ = q > .5.
First consider possible equilibria with x > .5. From (1) and (2) it follows
that if x > .5, then πp(x) = πu(x) when x = q. Therefore, (4) is satisﬁed
and an additional Nash equilibrium exists with x⋆ = q > .5.
If x < .5, then πp(x) = πu(x) when x = 1 − q. Therefore, an additional
Nash equilibrium exists with x⋆ = 1 − q < .5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (1), (2), and (9), F′(x⋆) can be written
F′(x⋆) =
(
γA(2x⋆ − 1 + q) if x⋆ ≤ .5
γA(2x⋆ − 1 − q) if x⋆ ≥ .5
(16)
Consider each statement of the proposition in turn.
29For all values of q and A, the second-stage subgame has a stable Nash equi-
librium with x⋆ = 0.
From Proposition 1, there exists a Nash equilibrium with x = 0, for all
values of q and A. From (16), F′(0) = −γA(1 − q) < 0. Therefore, this
equilibrium is stable for all values of q and A.
If q = .5, the subgame has one additional unstable equilibrium with x⋆ = .5.
Because F′(x) > 0 for x ≤ .5, a small decrease in x from x⋆ = .5, does
not result in an increase in x, but causes x to fall further. Therefore, the
equilibrium x⋆ = .5, that exists when q = .5, is unstable.
If .5 < q < 1, the subgame has one additional stable equilibrium, with x⋆ =
q > .5, and one unstable equilibrium, with x⋆ = 1 − q < .5.
Consider each of the two Nash equilibria from Proposition 1. First,
consider the equilibrium with x⋆ = q > .5. From (16), F′(q) = −γA(1−q) <
0; therefore, this equilibrium is stable. Next, consider the equilibrium with
x⋆ = 1 − q < .5. Because F′(1 − q) = γA(1 − q) > 0, this equilibrium is
unstable.
The unstable equilibrium deﬁnes the border of the basins of attraction of the
two stable equilibria.
Consider the middle graph of Figure 2. Any initial population proportion
to the left of the unstable equilibrium will converge to x⋆ = 0. Any initial
population proportion to the right of the unstable equilibrium will converge
to x⋆ = q > .5. Therefore, the unstable equilibrium deﬁnes the border of
the basins of attraction of the two stable equilibria. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. From the pattern of the slopes of the payoﬀ
functions, stated in (5) and (5), it follows that a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium with x⋆ > .5 is that
πu(0,τ,q) > πp(0,τ,q). Using (1) and (2), this condition is equivalent to
τ > 1 − q (17)
Given (4), from (1) and (2) it follows that if τ > 1−q, then the unique Nash
equilibrium is
x⋆ =
q
q + (1 − τ)(1 − q)
(18)
which is greater than .5 for all (τ,q) that satisﬁes τ > 1−q. Using (16) and
(18),
F′(x⋆) = −γA(1 − τ)(1 − q) < 0 (19)
Therefore, the equilibrium is stable. Q.E.D.
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